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Editor’s Note:
This is the first article in a three-part special issue on “Pacific Islands, Extreme Environments” edited by Andrea E. Murray. Kelman explores
case studies from particularly vulnerable Small Island Developing States (SIDS), including Samoa, Tonga, and the Solomon Islands, to
articulate a new theory of disaster risk governance that accounts for the disproportionate climate change-related consequences suffered by
these low-lying island countries.
Summary
This article examines disaster risk governance for island case studies, focusing on Pacific Small Island Developing States (SIDS). SIDS
examples are used to examine two main areas in line with this special issue’s themes: power and knowledge in disaster risk governance. The
interactions between those themes are explored for three SIDS governance scales: regional, national, and sub-national. Linking the theoretical
discussion with empirical examples demonstrates how bypassing government can be suitable for disaster risk governance.
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Islands and disaster risk
Islands are often portrayed in myths and stories as romantic, exciting, exquisite, and alluring. On occasion, reality mirrors parts of this image of
ideals, yet even so, governing islands and island communities brings immense challenges.1 One particular governance challenge is disasters.
A disaster is defined by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR)2 as “A serious disruption of the functioning of a
community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the
affected community or society to cope using its own resources”. Pacific island communities are among the most risk-prone in the world.
Dealing with disasters entails post-disaster activities such as response, recovery, and reconstruction along with pre-disaster activities termed
“disaster risk reduction”. Disaster risk reduction is defined as “The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to
analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and
property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events”.3 Disaster risk reduction includes
preparation, planning and mitigation.
This article examines disaster risk governance for island communities—before, during, and after disasters. Two main areas are highlighted in
line with this issue’s themes: power and knowledge in governance. The discussion demonstrates how demonstrates how nongovernmental
actions can support (or supplement) official disaster risk governance. The ideas presented are possibilities which policy makers should consider
for enacting disaster risk reduction—as along as they carefully examine both the advantages and disadvantages of the pathways and are
clear regarding the potential positive and detrimental consequences. As such, this article offers not so much a policy agenda or policy
recommendations as policy options, which those involved in island governance—not just island government—could and should have on the
table.
The differentiation between governance and government is key.4 Governance refers to actions, processes, and systems creating, evolving,
and monitoring rules and regulations (e.g. administration, markets, and networks) by which people function within society. Government refers to
the bodies that are charged with formalising and enforcing governance.
The subset of islands for this article is the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), comprising several dozen countries and territories in the
tropics and low-latitude subtropics,5 out of which the Pacific SIDS are the focus of this paper. Examples of sovereign Pacific SIDS are Kiribati
and Tonga, while representative non-sovereign Pacific SIDS include Guam and New Caledonia. Pacific SIDS and their communities recognise
that they face common governance challenges, including severe disaster risk, as well as similar governance solutions, such as tight and trusted
kinship networks moving quickly in times of crisis. This article contributes to this literature by exploring more specifically how government can
sometimes be effectively bypassed or supplemented by disaster risk governance.
An example of disaster risk reduction and disaster response from a Pacific SIDS comes from the Solomon Islands. Tsunamis were generated
following an earthquake on 1 April 2007. Traditional building techniques prevented numerous earthquake casualties, while traditional
knowledge dictated seeking higher ground after an earthquake. Consequently, only 52 people were killed despite the tsunami destroying
thousands of buildings whose occupants could have been killed if the buildings had collapsed in the earthquake or if the occupants had not
known to evacuate post-earthquake.6
Many of the disaster risk governance challenges for Pacific SIDS emerge due to the inherent island characteristics of isolation, restricted land
area, small populations, and limited domestic land-based livelihoods.7 These traits restrict evacuation opportunities, limit resources available for
disaster-related activities, and inhibit outside assistance. Yet these same island characteristics frequently offer disaster risk governance
opportunities.8 Small, isolated populations form tight kinship networks, a strong sense of identity, and an intimate connection with the natural
environment, both on land and in the sea, all of which contribute positively to disaster risk reduction on islands.9
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Pacific SIDS possess millennia of experience in dealing with environmental and social changes in isolation—with varying degrees of success
and failure. This experience provides the islanders with a solid baseline and extensive traditional knowledge to adjust their disaster risk
governance for addressing more recent social and environmental changes.10 In contemporary times, opportunities to address disaster-related
challenges and opportunities locally are often boosted by remittances from islanders overseas and by development or humanitarian aid,
providing an external source of support to governance at all scales on an island or in an island community.11 When people obtain external
sources of funding directly, they can choose to bypass all levels of government to make their own decisions. In fact, post-disaster remittances
in Samoa (tsunami in 2009, Cyclone Evan in 2012) exceeded foreign aid in terms of swiftness, usefulness, and effectiveness.12
Despite the large hurdles for disaster risk governance in Pacific SIDS,
these settings can also present impressive advantages for disaster risk
governance—if those advantages are used appropriately and if lessons
from the past are learned and applied. Nevertheless, the history of
disaster research reveals a limited focus on, and limited acceptance of,
island governance case studies. Only one main research group explicitly
recognised the advantages of studying island disaster risk governance:
the Bradford Disaster Research Unit (BDRU) in the 1970s.13 This research
unit was founded at the Project Planning Centre of the University of
Bradford in the UK by the head of the Project Planning Centre, Michael
Gane, and James Lewis supported by the Leverhulme Trust. With work in
the Pacific and the Caribbean, BDRU paved the way for exploring disaster
risk governance in the context of island communities with a focus on SIDS.
This highlighting of BDRU does not denigrate the numerous island,
disaster, and governance studies that exist alongside this work. Plenty of
mono-disciplinary perspectives have yielded important insights into the
topic. For example, in the 1950s, disasters on islands across the Pacific
were investigated in Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands, and
the Federated States of Micronesia.14 Although not formally governance
studies, such work reveals successful and unsuccessful governance approaches influencing how island communities and island governments
were and were not able to deal with disaster risk.
In contemporary development terminology, these studies demonstrated disaster risk reduction because hazards were accepted as being a part
of regular life, rather than as external extremes to be addressed with protective measures.15 “Disaster” was rarely a cultural concept within the
communities, because people knew how to survive many forms of extremes, and anything that needed to be rebuilt afterwards was simply
rebuilt.16 Often, “disaster risk governance” meant that communities dealt with a disaster as best as they could, without assistance from the
outside world—or without the outside world’s knowledge about what was happening on the island.
When the media, expatriates, or other governments were aware of the situation and wished to respond, leading to attempts at externally
governing an island community’s disaster risk, the effort sometimes supported and sometimes inhibited an island community. Niua Fo’ou is an
outer island of Tonga where, in 1946, after the island’s volcano started erupting, its population requested outside assistance for a complete
evacuation and temporary resettlement.17 The external support facilitated evacuation and resettlement. At other times, the outside intervention
created more of a disaster than was posed by the initial hazard. Frosts in 1972 in PNG’s highlands led to a massive relief operation, which
undermined local coping mechanisms that had worked for centuries, creating longer-term aid dependency within a previously self-sufficient
population.18
Other aspects of island community characteristics within disaster risk governance on Pacific SIDS are revealed by case studies focusing on the
island characteristics of the place investigated, as in post-hurricane action in Fiji following Tropical Cyclone Bebe in 1972.19 Drawing on such
work, the focus of more recent disaster risk governance studies in island settings has been from a participatory development perspective.
“Participatory development research” means active collaboration with the people and communities who are the research participants. The
research process can support action on the people’s own terms to deal with any identified concerns. The populations are not just research
subjects, but become active participants in governing the research and in implementing the recommendations, which is particularly important
when researchers depart after the end of a project.
As demonstrated in the examples throughout this article, participatory development research forms a key governance technique for addressing
Pacific SIDS’ disaster risk beyond government. Disaster risk governance becomes relevant for day-to-day community life to ensure that external
regional resources are requested by the affected communities and do not undermine communities’ traditional coping mechanisms. This topic is
now explored in more detail in terms of power and knowledge.
Power
Disaster risk governance is imbued with power relations.20 For Pacific SIDS, one prominent example is dealing with the hazard driver of climate
change. Historically, affluent countries such as in North America and Europe have consumed most fossil fuels leading to most greenhouse gas
emissions. Meanwhile, deforestation in less affluent countries occurs predominantly for commercial industrial-scale agriculture serving distant
markets in more affluent countries.21 SIDS have contributed negligible carbon emissions from either fossil fuel use or land use changes, in
absolute terms and on a per capita basis.22 Climate change related contributions still emerge across Pacific SIDS, such as forest destruction in
PNG,23 heavy reliance on diesel and oil in Samoa,24 and fossil fuel extraction by Timor-Leste.25
Yet SIDS are expected to experience disproportionate consequences from climate change.26 Changing precipitation regimes affecting
freshwater resources, coral reefs dying from bleaching induced by warmer seas and increased ocean acidity, and sea-level rise changing island
geomorphology are all contributing to major changes across SIDS. The worst-case scenario, which is currently being debated by several Pacific
SIDS, is the evacuation of their entire countries and settlement elsewhere (such as Australia or New Zealand) due to climate change making
their islands uninhabitable.27
Pacific SIDS have little power to stop climate change, yet must deal with a problem caused by other countries. Those who caused the problem
—namely the larger, more affluent, more powerful countries such as the U.K. and the U.S.A., but now including larger, less affluent but also
powerful countries such as Brazil, China, and India—are also generally unwilling to provide the resources necessary for Pacific SIDS to deal
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with the challenges on their own terms.
Is it possible to change the power relations to achieve the action needed by SIDS now? There have been numerous theories of power
throughout the centuries28 as power has been theorised and debated for different governance scales29 and for levels of dependency.30 The
challenge is determining how much baseline theories are really applicable in practice.
Within theories of social change, three ways are proposed in which a major change of a social order could occur,31 interpreted here for Pacific
SIDS and climate change. First, those with power use that power to change the current situation. For climate change, that seems to be unlikely
until those with the power are directly affected, which is likely to be too late for Pacific SIDS.
Second, those who hold power change, so that new leaders implement the changes that were previously avoided. To some degree, that is
happening as those who have been educated with an environmental consciousness gradually assume power within the multinational
corporations and big-country governments that have so far blocked progress on climate change. Nevertheless, in the face of growing
awareness of climate crisis in both corporate and government quarters, can we anticipate significant changes among those that have so far
blocked progress on climate change? The new generation might also assume power over those groups, as consumers for multinational
corporations and as electorates of governments. This process is slow, possibly too slow for Pacific SIDS, and has no guarantee of success.
Third, small changes can aggregate to the large transformation sought, which is the theory behind local environmental movements achieving
significant local successes but whose wider-scale effect is so far limited. In the case of climate change affecting Pacific SIDS, this form of
disaster risk governance seems unlikely to yield substantial results. The reason is small changes happening through local governance, such as
developing coconut biodiesel in the Solomon Islands, would need to be aggregated up to larger governance scales without causing more
problems, such as replacing all crops with coconut palms to make money from biodiesel fuel.32 This aggregation would need to continue at the
regional and international levels, requiring support beyond the Pacific SIDS, but as discussed above, to date, those most responsible for
causing climate change are not yet willing to undertake significant action regarding it.
An example of a proactive approach for overcoming power imbalances for
disaster risk governance comes from Samoa implementing local coastal
management within a national framework.33 Facilitated by external
funding, external consultants worked with the national government to
develop a coastal management plan for the entire country. National staff
were trained in local participatory development processes which they in
turn implemented with local leaders. Traditional Samoan consultation and
decision procedures led coastal villages to develop their own coastal
management plans. With the local leaders, those plans were integrated at
the district level to avoid actions in one locale creating or exacerbating
problems in another place. Similarly, the district plans were integrated into
a national coastal management plan and strategy. The national strategy
was returned to each participating district and community along with the
local and district maps that had been produced by the process. As such,
all three governance scales were directly involved and connected.
Results included increased links amongst villages within districts for
environment and sustainability topics (horizontal governance) along with
increased connections amongst the national, district, and local levels
(vertical governance). In this instance, national and local governments
were included, not bypassed, to effect successful disaster risk
governance.
In contrast, a volcanic eruption on Vanuatu showed how trust for disaster risk reduction can be eroded by top-down disaster risk governance
and power imbalances. On Ambae Island, Vanuatu, a volcanic crisis in 1995 led emergency managers to implement top-down approaches with
limited community consultation, fomenting distrust between the local islanders and those from the capital, Port Vila, and outside of Vanuatu.34
By working with the community on the community’s terms, and by respecting and combining different knowledge forms for disaster risk
governance, researchers in Vanuatu overcame the established power imbalances and mistrust. They implemented participatory techniques for
developing guidelines and an alert system to deal with future volcanic eruptions, which were accepted by the community and national
emergency managers. The community was able to help themselves based on local knowledge, while respecting and accepting external
support when needed—effectively linking the regional and local governance scales with more limited input from national governance.
From climate change to coastal management to a volcanic eruption, challenges and solutions regarding power relations are demonstrated for
disaster risk governance. In the case of climate change, larger countries with the greatest power seem to be the least likely to engage in
climate change risk governance for Pacific SIDS. For coastal management and volcanic eruption, governance scales were connected to seek a
power balance, although the role of governments varied in scope. Governments have a role to play within the power relations of disaster risk
governance, but governments are not necessarily the main, effective governing bodies.
Knowledge
A prominent form of power is access or lack of access to knowledge.35 Different knowledge types can play key roles in overcoming or creating
power imbalances in order to govern disaster risk, such as the division of knowledge into being internal or external to a community. Internal
knowledge might be traditional, vernacular, indigenous or come from local scientific investigations. External knowledge also involves scientific
investigations, sometimes with contributions that could not be made through traditional or local knowledge. Examples are remote-sensed data
and geological investigations beyond the millennial time scale. External knowledge can incorporate traditional, vernacular, and indigenous
knowledge from other locations that is deemed transferable to the location being investigated. External knowledge lacks the contextualisation
and depth which internal knowledge proffers after having been built up over generations of living in the same place while observing the
environment and society.
The applicability of knowledge forms, and different combinations of knowledge, to a specific situation varies. Sometimes, one type of
knowledge supersedes other types. For example, in vernacular architecture on some Pacific SIDS such as the Solomon Islands36 and Tonga,37
wood was frequently used while walls and roofs were joined with vines. One result was comparatively high earthquake and cyclone resistance,
well embedded in traditional knowledge. Wood is more flexible than masonry in earthquakes and high winds, making it safer for smaller
structures, but rarely being able to scale up structure size. Tying roofs to walls and tying walls to the foundation prevents uplift during cyclones.
This literature does not always give full details on whether those architectural and engineering approaches were selected due to experiences
with hazards, for other reasons such as material availability and cost, or for a combination of reasons.
Today, some Pacific SIDS peoples observe other forms of construction, namely masonry, and equate that with a modern, affluent, aesthetically
improved lifestyle. Aside from being more expensive and therefore demonstrating affluence, the implementation of modern masonry is not
embedded in traditional, local skills. A danger exists of the dwellings being more vulnerable to earthquakes and cyclones than traditional
dwellings. Even if built correctly by masons or engineers from outside the community, no guarantee exists that the structure will be maintained
properly. Meanwhile, masonry buildings tend to be less suited to a tropical climate than timber buildings. Even with that knowledge regarding
practicalities, the knowledge of what represents power, modernisation, and affluence can be a powerful driver towards increasing disaster
vulnerability in Pacific SIDS.
In other cases, none of the various traditional or contemporary knowledge forms available appear to be fully applicable owing to unknowns and
uncertainties. Climate change is an example. The currently projected environmental changes will take the Pacific SIDS into a climatic regime
which humanity has not before experienced.38 Traditional knowledge, in effect, is expected to become partly out-dated because it is based on
conditions which the people have already experienced and passing those experiences down through generations. Traditional knowledge
nonetheless remains important for responding to climate change. It provides an anchor from which the Pacific SIDS peoples can base their
observations of ongoing, rapid changes. It remains pertinent in other ways, such as drawing on kinship links and existing community support
networks and structures for responding to short-term and long-term changes.
Furthermore, large-scale climate changes are not new to the Pacific. The literature39 describes the ‘A.D. 1300 Event’ referring to a major
environmental shift around the Pacific in the fourteenth century, which they then link to cultural changes. The environmental changes are
highlighted by the region’s climate cooling, the sea level falling which in turn exposed—and potentially precipitated the mortality of—coral reefs,
and El Niño events increasing in frequency, which likely led to more erratic weather including a short-term increase in precipitation.
Simultaneously around the Pacific region, living and cultural patterns appear to have changed suddenly. Settlements had principally been in
coastal locations, making them accessible and allowing access to the tidal and marine zones for livelihoods. This pattern shifted towards
locations permitting fortification and a dramatic decrease in accessibility for the communities, supporting indications of increased conflict. The
latter might be linked to resource scarcity, with evidence pointing towards decreased food availability. Contact with other communities
decreased as long, oceanic voyages became less frequently attempted and/or less successful. This literature40 correlates the environmental
and social changes, further arguing that social changes were directly caused by environmental changes.
The fourteenth century experiences and knowledge available for responding to environmental changes are different from experiences and
knowledge today. The fourteenth century responses appear to have been mainly reactive. Today’s Pacific SIDS communities can learn from
this prior experience while combining traditional knowledge and scientific knowledge (from history and archaeology to climate modelling and
ecology) in order to identify gaps to be filled for addressing contemporary climate change. Where sub-national governance could not achieve
this goal, then national or regional governance could be asked to support the process.
A similar situation applies to volcanoes. Tafahi is a volcano and island of Tonga, situated near Samoa. Scientific knowledge suggests that an
eruption occurred in recent centuries, but the volcano has not been studied in detail meaning that the time of past eruptions and the exact
volcanic phenomena produced are not pinpointed.41 Tafahi is understudied from a physical volcanology perspective42 and no publications
were found on the social volcanology of the area. Traditional knowledge provides stories that might suggest an ash cloud occurred in the
past,43 but the literature does not indicate whether local people were able to deal with the impacts. Just over 1,700 people live within 30
kilometres of the volcano.44 Depending on the wind’s direction, they could be severely affected by a future tephra-producing eruption. A
settlement of 60 people sits on Tafahi Island45 which could be affected by pyroclastic flows.
Based on these references, and the absence of further material, the islanders appear to have little concept that phenomena such as tephra
and pyroclastic flows are possible because their internal knowledge contains the stories focusing on a dark period (possibly caused by ash
blocking the sun), but not including details of particulates, the presence of eruptive columns, or the implications of the dark period. Meanwhile,
contemporary scientific approaches are unable to develop predictive scenarios for a potential eruption46 with a high degree of accuracy
because the geological knowledge needed for the models has not yet been collected.4748
The knowledge gaps do not preclude action now to consider and prepare for a Tafahi eruption. Other examples49 could be analysed for their
transferability to Tafahi, including potential action to take regarding health50 and relocation.51 Scientific publications also describe local
knowledge regarding disaster risk governance around Tafahi.52 Traditional knowledge needs to be examined further to determine how the
islanders living around the volcano could govern themselves with respect to disaster risk. Possibilities include preparing for evacuating the
island and dealing with a widespread ashfall. Notably, these approaches encompass regional and local governance, but not national
governance; national government is effectively bypassed to achieve the desired disaster risk governance, partly because the capital,
Nuku’alofa, is so far away.
Bringing together the climate and volcano examples, the lesson is that both limitations to and advantages of all forms of knowledge are
evident. A single knowledge type cannot provide the entire picture for disaster risk governance. Instead, knowledge types must be melded and
balanced to draw on the strengths of each while overcoming each type’s limitations. While this approach can be hard to implement in the midst
of an ongoing crisis, disaster risk reduction can be used to bring together people with different knowledge forms in order to combine the
knowledges and to generate collaboration amongst the different groups.
This approach has been completed for the Pacific SIDS of PNG.53 A simple framework was developed and tested for combining knowledge
internal and external to three indigenous communities experiencing hazards such as floods, landslides, and a volcanic eruption. The
governance approach involved participatory development work but aimed to overcome power imbalances within the communities by enacting
full consultation with, and sharing knowledge amongst, all groups. Although PNG’s national government had agreed to the work, neither they
nor regional governance structures were directly involved. The framework was developed and implemented factoring in local governance
aspects such as livelihoods, traditions, and poor access routes to the villages. Using the lessons from disaster risk governance in PNG, the
framework was then adjusted to apply specifically to climate change for all SIDS.54
A wider approach to combining different knowledge forms for governing climate change action as part of disaster risk reduction for Arctic and
SIDS peoples is epitomised by the Many Strong Voices programme. The programme works with and supports all three levels of governance—
regional, national, and sub-national—aiming to bring local voices and knowledge to the forefront. Promoting Pacific SIDS’ peoples’ own
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knowledge for their own action on disaster risk governance gives them significant power in overcoming the climate change challenges that
have been imposed on them. As noted above, climate change is making many aspects of traditional knowledge of diminished relevance due to
the changing environment. Even past scientific knowledge about a location might not be fully applicable to envisioning and planning for the
future. The environmental (and social) baselines are changing, so the past is not necessarily a full guide to the future.
In atoll communities on PNG and Tuvalu, for instance, communities are
experiencing sea floods where neither scientific investigations nor
traditional knowledge suggest that such floods have occurred before. In
trying to project into the future, large uncertainties remain and the ultimate
outcome could depend as much on human action at the local level as on
climate change’s impacts. For example, in response to increasing sea
flooding, some coastal property owners on PNG, Tonga, and Tuvalu have
built a sea wall in front of their property. The sea walls change shoreline
dynamics as much as sea-level rise changes them, because the sea walls
reflect wave energy without giving the waves a chance to slow down and
drop their sediment, replenishing the beach. Traditional knowledge has
not been aware of the impact of sea walls, but scientific knowledge
informed the communities, such as on PNG’s atoll of Takuu where, at the
community’s request, external donors brought in external experts to work
with the local community.55 The regional and local governance scales were
connected, irrespective of the national governance scale (cf. Murray’s
review of “There Once Was an Island” in this issue).
Consequently, traditional and local knowledge forms need to be combined
with contemporary scientific and contemporary knowledge forms. Climate
change adaptation measures, a necessary component of disaster risk
reduction, would not only be based in community traditions but would also factor in available knowledge regarding the impact of measures
undertaken and what the community’s environment could be in the future. Other climate change impacts that might require adjustments
beyond the SIDS communities’ traditional experiences are a climate amenable to different food sources, changing freshwater regimes, coral
reefs that are more sensitive to external use, and tropical cyclones encroaching into locations with limited prior experience.56
Numerous layered changes at different governance scales impact Pacific SIDS communities when they implement disaster risk governance for
volcanic eruptions and climate change. Different knowledge forms are needed to inform governance actions, but not all knowledge emerges
from government or “expert” sources-- nor do government or “expert” sources necessarily respect all knowledge forms. Pacific SIDS case
studies as described here demonstrate that multiple knowledge types assist by (i) being able to triangulate information and action proposals; (ii)
drawing from a range of data and experiences to reduce the likelihood of overlooking evidence or options; and (iii) reducing knowledge-related
power imbalances by accepting, sharing, and combining all knowledge forms on equitable terms.
Power and knowledge interacting in disaster risk governance
For disaster risk governance in Pacific SIDS, this article has presented a discussion of power and knowledge. This section now suggests some
knowledge-power interactions, some of which were alluded to the previous section. The discussion provides options and opportunities for
policy makers to ensure that they fully consider the range of possibilities which they have available for disaster risk reduction governance,
including but not limited to governance.
Pooled governance is one method by which Pacific SIDS implement disaster risk governance using their knowledge and power. Multilateral
organisations can take the lead in disaster risk governance in their own right, even when they comprise governments. The Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS) is a SIDS intergovernmental organisation that lobbies and negotiates on behalf of SIDS regarding climate change
topics. This form of pooled governance helps to overcome the limitations of each SIDS’ government’s small size—scaling up from the national
governance scale to the regional governance scale. By creating regional pools of resources supporting supra-national agencies, SIDS create a
focal point for donors while developing in-house technical capability that supports all SIDS governments in dealing with their disaster risk
governance responsibilities. Power is created through pooling resources and knowledge.
For example, Tuvalu is a party to numerous international environmental treaties with relevance to disaster risk governance, most of which are
highly technical including the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification. Larger countries have groups of Masters-level or PhD-level experts
trained in each treaty to implement and monitor it. Tuvalu’s population could not produce a similar level of experts for every single treaty to
which they are party. Should Tuvalu avoid signing the treaties? Then, it would seem as if the country were not committed to the goals and
priorities in the agreements.
Instead, Tuvalu’s national government recognises that, at times, it must be bypassed for appropriate treaty implementation which pools
resources to create multilateral organisations such as AOSIS, and others mentioned below. The multilateral cooperation overcomes
governmental knowledge deficiencies, combines knowledge from around the region, provides each SIDS with approximately the same power,
and generates a power base for a SIDS region or for all SIDS. These processes represent knowledge-based technical effectiveness with an
even balance of power. Diverse people, geographies, and circumstances of the SIDS national governments capture the experiences and skills
from all SIDS. Rather than a single national outlook, pooling resources creates the advantage of being able to draw on multiple perspectives
and approaches while achieving efficiency and effectiveness in disaster risk governance.
For disaster risk reduction in the Pacific, the main multilateral focal point is the Secretariat of the Pacific Community’s Applied Geoscience and
Technology Division (SPC SOPAC), which runs its Disaster Reduction Programme providing technical and policy advice. For the specific hazard
driver of climate change, the Pacific SIDS have the Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). SPREP provides
information and advice to Pacific SIDS governments and communities regarding what should be done regarding climate change, at policy,
technical, and operational levels. The Caribbean SIDS have parallel multilateral organisations, one for all disaster risk reduction and one for
climate change only, but other SIDS do not have similar regional organisations for dealing with any form of disaster risk governance. They are
not fully represented in regional governance.
In addition to these pooled multinational efforts, non-governmental initiatives exist that include, but extend beyond, Pacific SIDS governments
to deal with disasters. Many Strong Voices, mentioned earlier, is an example. Such initiatives engage with and are supported by Pacific SIDS
governments, even though the governments are only one player amongst many, because they realise that pooling is needed to overcome the
limitations of small government and to enhance the advantages of different countries with similar challenges.
Non-sovereign Pacific SIDS are involved too. Several are members of SPC SOPAC and SPREP, bypassing the SIDS’ governing state for
disaster risk governance. The non-sovereign Pacific SIDS nonetheless retain connections to their governing state, despite options for
independence, permitting them to employ a specific power and knowledge strategy: the assumption (often without evidence) that the SIDS’
governing state will assist in times of need by always providing appropriate interventions.57 Consequently, many non-sovereign SIDS actively
oppose the power which sovereignty would bring them, because they have enough political and legal powers to be satisfied while being able
to retain a direct connection to their governing state for requesting assistance when needed.58 The non-sovereign SIDS gain a psychological
governance crutch in assuming that they can rely on the governing state for disaster risk reduction and post-disaster help—even where
previous patterns demonstrate a regular lack of support from the governing state.
In fact, Pacific SIDS’ communities have been accused of succumbing to the ‘handout mentality’, inhibiting local disaster risk reduction.59 The
problem of focusing on post-disaster actions in order to obtain handouts in the form of aid, rather than implementing disaster risk reduction, is
illustrated. Many Pacific SIDS experience different governance desires between those trying to take local control of disaster risk reduction in
order to avoid a disaster and those who are content to rely on handouts, from the governing state and elsewhere. Disagreements and
frustration can emerge where aid is requested from the SIDS’ government or governing state, but is not forthcoming. The fundamental issue is
often power: politicians can garner support through handing out relief supplies or through blaming someone else for a disaster or lack of
disaster aid, but credit is rarely available for individuals who are responsible for averting disasters due to disaster risk reduction. It can be a
double-edged sword: if disaster response is seen to be incompetent or if blaming others is seen as neglecting duties, then a politician or
government could be politically damaged.
Tikopia and Anuta, small islands in the far eastern Solomon Islands, are a disaster aid example with intertwined elements of power, knowledge,
ethnic tension, and remoteness. The islands have neither airstrips, nor jetties, nor reliable off-island communication systems. On 28 December
2002, Category 5 Cyclone Zoë struck Tikopia and Anuta.60 No one on the two islands died immediately, because the populations had
retreated to higher ground to avoid the cyclone-related flooding while being somewhat sheltered from the high winds. Bypassing government
for disaster risk governance is exemplified since the population saved themselves by using their own warning and response systems.
The flipside was that little food and water survived the storm, and many houses completely disappeared, leaving the islanders needing
emergency assistance. Their radios used for off-island communication had not worked before the storm, so no means were available of
communicating their situation. The outside world including the Solomon Islands’ government did little to assist until a journalist hired a
helicopter in nearby Vanuatu, landed on one of the islands, and brought the story to the world by selling an exclusive to an Australian
newspaper. An international aid response resulted, eventually joined by the Solomon Islands’ government—which was hindered by its own
financial difficulties as well as ethnic differences feeding into ongoing conflict between the affected islands and the island with the Solomon
Islands’ capital city. Even where post-disaster assistance was needed and requested, it was more effective to bypass government. Individual
decision-making is highlighted, with a “wild card” at the regional governance level in the form of an external journalist connecting directly with
the communities affected, leading to a regional response with the national government eventually joining.
Should the residents of Tikopia and Anuta have done more for disaster risk reduction at the national level prior to the cyclone? Aside from the
logistical difficulties of doing so, given the islands’ isolation, challenging the established power systems can yield positive, longer-term results by
gaining knowledge and shifting the power balance. If the people on Ambae had accepted the top-down interventions without complaint, then
their obsequiousness would have perpetuated the knowledge and power imbalances supporting the vulnerability, which led to the disaster and
the lack of post-disaster aid. Creating a conflict-ridden situation over power and knowledge contributed towards identifying problems and then
rebalancing power and knowledge in order to try to resolve the identified problems.
For Ambae, Samoa, and the PNG villages, knowledge delivery and combining different knowledge forms led to a re-balancing of power,
permitting the communities to govern disaster risk irrespective of the national government’s support or lack thereof. Frameworks exist to support
this work as applied in PNG.61 The combination of frameworks was then tested for disaster risk reduction including climate change adaptation
in Timor-Leste.62 As expected, the lessons from Timor-Leste included some aspects being transferable from PNG and some aspects not being
transferable from PNG.
Due to the high degree of localisation and contextualisation necessary, developing fixed guidelines for pooled approaches in all locations, for
all topics, and for all circumstances would not be possible since much depends on the local circumstances and the specific disaster risk
context. Different interpretations of governance, power, knowledge, participation, and consultation would create different outcomes amongst
the various parties involved in each case study. Instead, the most successful approach would be having a general framework63 to be adjusted
locally as part of the process of involving communities in disaster risk governance. Enacting the process of developing a locally specific
framework further assists in determining the power relations amongst different community sectors and putting forward the different knowledge
forms which exist in the community in order to bring them together for disaster risk governance. Pacific SIDS case studies illustrate the power-
knowledge interconnections occurring for disaster risk reduction governance at all governance scales.
Conclusions: Supranational and local governance
The lessons emerging from this article focus on comparing and connecting different governance scales for disaster risk for Pacific SIDS,
especially for knowledge and power. It is particularly telling how much is necessarily completed at the supra-national and sub-national (mainly
community) levels, thereby bypassing government (national and local) in order to be successful in disaster risk governance.64 Some cautions
are needed for a full interpretation.
Pacific SIDS’ governments should not be blamed for any deficiencies in national governance due to challenges of small scale, notably with
regards to personnel, and limited resources. With some Pacific SIDS having populations in the tens of thousands, it is unrealistic to expect to
find a civil servant conversant in every disaster-related topic. Hence, the need for pooled governance as part of acquiring and applying
knowledge alongside self-empowerment.
Yet Pacific SIDS’ governments are flawed in ways that go beyond a lack of resources and small scale. Nauru squandered its phosphate
wealth, partly through internal mistakes and partly through external exploitation.65 Tonga took its first major step towards representative
democracy in 2010 but still invests significant power in its monarchy.66 While supra-national governance can contribute to avoiding some of
these national problems, supra-national entities—even with their extensive checks and balances—can be prone to corruption, incompetence,
naivety, abuses of power, ignorance, and exploitation.67 SPC SOPAC and SPREP are continually stretched regarding demands on their
resources and time, because they depend on international donors for their operations.
Meanwhile, at the local level, many Pacific SIDS communities are run by a formal governance structure that is not government per se. For
example, outer atolls in some Pacific SIDS have hereditary chiefs but relatively communal decision-making.68 In cases such as Savo in the
Solomon Islands, a mixture of governmental and non-governmental governance structures leads the communities, a variation of interactive
governance.69 A system of “Bigmen” (chiefs) and elders govern alongside decision-making from democratically elected representatives who sit
in the provincial parliament.70 Consequently, bypassing government for governance might never be feasible in some SIDS.
Local approaches are not a panacea. In addition to advantages, they also have disadvantages. Two examples are detailed here: (i) causing
disaster risk governance problems for others and (ii) engraining cultural aspects that are detrimental to disaster risk governance over the long-
term.
If a local approach implements governance without due regard to considerations beyond the local context, then problems might emerge
elsewhere. This situation represents the classic upstream/downstream problem in environmental management and development.71 One
community solves its waste problem by dumping it downstream in the river, yet further downstream sits another community that receives the
waste from the upstream community. For disaster risk governance, flood management measures upstream, such as building a dam or other
forms of river engineering, impact the ability of communities downstream to govern their own flood and drought regimes.72
The Samoa case study73 demonstrates how this problem could be overcome without sacrificing local governance by integrating the sub-
national, national, and regional governance scales. Using an externally driven approach with the support of the national level, solutions were
developed at the local level and then brought together at the district level to identify any upstream/downstream problems that could result
through local implementation. Next, integrating district-level approaches through further upscaling produced a national strategy, including
monitoring at all scales. While the potential still exists for problems to emerge, a useful balance was struck between the need for local
empowerment through using local knowledge and the need for larger-scale coherence and overviews of disaster risk governance.
The second example is local attitudes and engrained cultural practices that might not support the desired long-term outcome, with examples
being gender and ethnic inequalities. A local majority might decide that discrimination due to gender, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, disability, or
culture is appropriate, even though that tends to perpetuate disaster risk.74 Participatory development approaches mean that all members of a
community must be treated with respect and must contribute to disaster risk governance through knowledge and power sharing. Where local
preferences interfere with such principles, it might be appropriate to enact non-local approaches to ensure that discrimination is not
perpetuated.
Rather than assuming that one governance approach for disaster risk would be universally successful, a balance is needed. Achieving this
balance means recognising and accepting the roles of both governmental and non-governmental governance at the three scales. Achieving
this balance further means recognising and accepting the connections amongst different governance scales. Some aspects of government
can be bypassed at times to achieve successful disaster risk governance. Other governmental aspects are essential, depending on the
context. Pacific SIDS case studies have demonstrated the wide range of contexts, factoring in knowledge, power, and the interactions
between power and knowledge.
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